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THE EFFECT OF ILLEGAL ABDUCTIONS BY
LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS ON
PERSONAL JURISDICTION
During the past several years, the increase in worldwide drug smug-
gling operations has resulted in a corresponding increase in the kidnapping
of suspects by law enforcement authorities of the United States and other
countries for the purpose of acquiring jurisdiction.1 This trend indicates
that a question exists whether a court may or should exercise jurisdiction
over the person of a defendant who was illegally apprehended and forcibly
abducted into the jurisdiction to face criminal charges.
The recent cases of United States v. Toscani1o12 and United States
ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler3 addressed themselves to this issue. In Toscanino,
the defendant, a citizen of Italy, was convicted in the District Court for the
Eastern District of New York of conspiracy to violate the narcotics laws
of the United States.4 On his appeal of the conviction, Toscanino alleged
that jurisdiction was acquired over his person in an illegal manner, thus
vitiating the conviction.5 The defendant claimed that American agents had
illegally wiretapped his telephone and kidnapped him in Uruguay, then
tortured him and abducted him to the United States to stand trial. The
government did not respond to these allegations in the district court, claim-
ing that they were immaterial to the question of jurisdiction."
1. New York Times, Jan. 5, 1974, at 25, col. 6; id., Dec. 13, 1973, at 2, col. 5;
id., Oct. 17, 1973, at 14, col. 5. See generally Scott, Criminal Jurisdiction of a State
Over a Defendant Based Upon Presence Secured by Force or Fraud, 37 MINN. L. Rv.
91 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Scott, Criminal Jurisdiction]. In order for a criminal
conviction to be valid, the accused must normally be tried in the state in which the
alleged crime was committed. Note, Effect of Illegal Abduction into the Jurisdiction
on a Subsequent Conviction, 27 IND. L.J. 292 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Illegal
Abduction]; Dickinson, Jurisdiction Following Seizure or Arrest in Violation of
International Law, 28 Am. J. INT. L. 231 (1934).
2. 500 F.2d 267, petition for rehearing en banc denied, 504 F.2d 1380 (2d Cir.
1974).
3. 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975).
4. Toscanino was convicted of conspiracy to import narcotics into the United
States, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 173, 174 (1970). The government alleged, by way
of the testimony of one Caramian, a co-conspirator, that Toscanino agreed in the
summer of 1970 for him to find buyers for a shipment of heroin bound for the United
States to be delivered by another conspirator, Nicolay. Upon finding buyers for the
shipment, Caramian received part of the heroin from Toscanino delivered by Nicolay
in Miami. This shipment was intercepted by government agents. Toscanino denied
any knowledge of these transactions.
5. 500 F.2d at 268.
6. Id. at 270. The appellate court disagreed, holding that Toscanino was
entitled to invoke 18 U.S.C. § 3504 (1970), requiring the government to affirm or
deny the "unlawful act" of eavesdropping and electronic surveillance by the United
States in Uruguay, on the ground that the wiretapping was a violation of the fourth
amendment. Toscanino was not, according to the court, entitled to the statement if
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On the basis of two Supreme Court cases, Ker v. Illinois7 and Frisbie
v. Collins,8 the district court held that the manner in which Toscanino was
brought into the territory of the United States did not affect the court's
jurisdiction over him, provided "he was physically present at the time of
trial." 9
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held that Toscanino's allegations, if true, would strip the district court of
jurisdiction, and remanded the case for a hearing in which the government
would be required to affirm or deny Toscanino's allegations of illegal
conduct.10 The court based its conclusion as to divestment of jurisdic-
tion on two grounds: first, the due process clause required a court to
refrain from exercising jurisdiction over a defendant who has been kid-
napped and forcibly brought within the jurisdiction; second, the seizure of
the defendant in violation of the sovereignty of Uruguay, and consequently
in violation of the charters of the United Nations and the Organization of
American States, coupled with Uruguay's condemnation of the seizure of
Toscanino," permitted the defendant to invoke the violations for his in-
dividual benefit.
United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler12 involved a situation similar to
Toscanino, except that no torture or other inhumane conduct was involved.1 3
In Lujan, the defendant was indicted by a federal grand jury as a con-
based solely on the grounds of the federal statute on wiretapping and eavesdropping,
18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. (1970), as that statute is inapplicable outside the United
States. 500 F.2d at 279-81. For a discussion of the fourth amendment's extraterri-
torial application to unlawful wiretapping abroad, see 88 HARv. L. REv. 815, 823-24
(1975).
7. 119 U.S. 436 (1886). Ker involved an international kidnapping and abduc-
tion. The court held that no constitutional right had been violated, as the due process
clause only guaranteed fairness at trial. The circumstances by which the court acquired
presence of the defendant were held not to impair the court's right to try a person for
a crime. For an extended discussion of Ker; see notes 24-32 and accompanying text
infra.
8. 342 U.S. 519 (1952). Unlike Ker, Frisbie involved an interstate seizure. But
like Ker, the court answered Frisbie's due process argument by stating that due process
is satisfied if the defendant is accorded a fair trial. For an extended discussion of
Frisbie, see notes 33-39 and accompanying text infra.
9. 500 F.2d at 271.
10. 18 U.S.C. § 3504 (1970) requires the government to answer allegations
by the defendant of governmental misconduct in violation of the defendant's statutory
or constitutional rights. The court remanded the case to the district court to adjudi-
cate both the wiretapping claim and the allegations of torture and illegal abduction.
The court held that Toscanino was entitled to an evidentiary hearing with respect to
his allegation of forcible abduction only if, in response to the government's denial, he
offered some credible supporting evidence, including specifically, evidence that the
operation was undertaken by or at the direction of United States officials. 500 F.2d
at 279, 281.
11. Id. at 270.
12. 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975).
13. Id. at 66.
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spirator in the same plan to smuggle narcotics into the United States as
was charged to Toscanino. A warrant was issued for Lujan's arrest, and
was executed in "an unconventional manner" ;14 Lujan, a licensed pilot,
alleged that he was hired by one Duran to fly him from Argentina to
Bolivia, and when the plane landed in Bolivia, Lujan was seized by Bolivian
police acting as American agents. He was held for several days in Bolivia,
and then placed aboard a plane flying to the United States. There was no
allegation by Lujan that he was physically mistreated while in Bolivia, but
he did contend that he was not permitted to communicate with anyone.
Lujan sought a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the court was
required to divest itself of jurisdiction over him because he was kidnapped
by American agents into the United States, thereby violating the charters
of the United Nations and of the Organization of American States.' 5 The
Second Circuit rejected the argument, stating that Argentina's failure to
protest his abduction precluded his raising of an international law viola-
ation, and that the treatment accorded him during his abduction from
Argentina to the United States was not sufficiently reprehensible for appli-
cation of the holding in Toscanino.16 Thus, the Supreme Court's holdings
in Ker and Frisbie controlled.' 7 As a result of the Lujan decision, the
Second Circuit severely limited the parameters of Toscanino to require
divestment of jurisdiction only in cases of illegal abduction in which the
government engaged in "torture, brutality or . . .similar physical abuse."' 8
The Second Circuit's interpretation of Toscanino in Lujan does not
comport with the broad statements contained in the former opinion.
Toscanino appeared to hold that divestment of jurisdiction was consti-
tutionally required when the defendant's presence in the jurisdiction was
procured through deliberate misconduct in violation of constitutional pro-
visions, and the sovereignty of a foreign nation which the United States
had, by treaty, pledged to respect. The opinion did not give great weight
to the presence of torture in the case.19 It appears that Lujan, in dis-
tinguishing Toscanino solely on the basis of torture and similar reprehen-
sible conduct, incorrectly gauged the thrust of the opinion. As the later
pronouncement upon the question, however, Lujan must govern any con-
flict between the two cases.2 0
14. Id. at 63.
15. Id. at 63, 66.
16. Id. at 69.
17. Id. at 69 (concurring opinion). See notes 7 and 8 supra.
18. 510 F.2d at 69 (concurring opinion). The Toscanino opinion was written by
Judge Mansfield and joined in by Judge Oakes, with Judge Anderson writing a sepa-
rate concurring opinion. The Lujan opinion was written by Chief Judge Kaufman
joined in by Judge Oakes with Judge Anderson again writing a separate concurring
opinion.
19. If torture were the only factor relevant to divest the court of jurisdiction,
Toscanino would not have had to mention the fourth amendment. 500 F.2d at 275.
20. It appears that the seeming reversal of the court's holding within such a
short time may have been based on the views of the remaining judges on the Second
1975]
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Even to the extent that Toscanino and Lu/an are interpreted as hold-
ing that a court should not exercise jurisdiction over a defendant when his
presence was acquired through kidnapping and abduction coupled with tor-
ture, these decisions are still at variance with the rule accepted since 1886,21
that the right of a court to try a person will not be questioned as long as he
was found within its territorial jurisdiction and detained under lawfully
issued process.2 2 This note will explore the erosion of this rule due to the
changing notions of due process of law, both in the state and federal courts.
Further, the issue of whether violation of international treaties can be
invoked as an alternative means to divest the court of jurisdiction over
the defendant will be discussed.
THE Ker-Frisbie RULE
The line of cases establishing that the jurisdiction of a court to try
a criminal defendant was not affected by the manner of seizure began with
Ker v. Illinois.2 3 In Ker, the defendant was wanted for theft in Illinois and
the Governor requested the Secretary of State of the United States to
issue a warrant requesting Ker's extradition24 by the Executive of the
Republic of Peru, in compliance with a treaty between the United States
and Peru on that subject.25 The American agent, with papers in hand,
Circuit. Judge Anderson, who concurred in both Toscanino and LuJan, stated that
the denial of the motion for rehearing en banc in Toscanino was predicated on a
"narrow" reading of the holding:
. . . the majority [voting to deny the rehearing] obviously interpreted the decision
in Toscanino as resting solely and exclusively upon the use of torture and other
cruel and inhumane treatment of Toscanino in effecting his kidnapping and it
rejected the proposition that a kidnapping of a foreigner from his own or another
nation and his forcible delivery into the United States against his will, but
without torture, would itself violate due process.
510 F.2d at 69 (concurring opinion).
21. See Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886). Since the Ker decision, most courts
have not viewed any pre-trial events as affecting jurisdiction. See, e.g., United States
v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
22. Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U.S. 192 (1906); In re Johnson, 167 U.S. 120
(1896). See also Lascelles v. Georgia, 148 U.S. 537 (1893) ; Cook v. Hart, 146 U.S.
183 (1892); Annot., 18 A.L.R. 509 (1922); Annot., 56 A.L.R. 260 (1928); Annot.,
165 A.L.R. 947 (1946).
The rule articulated in Ker was first applied to state cases, and therefore the
Supreme Court ruled solely on constitutional issues. In Toscanino, the court buttressed
its contrary conclusion by noting that the federal courts may be held to stricter than
constitutional standards by the inherent supervisory power of appellate courts over
federal district courts. 500 F.2d at 277.
23. 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
24. Extradition has been defined as "the surrender by one nation to another of
an individual accused or convicted of an offense outside of its own territory, and
within the territorial jurisdiction of the other, which, being competent to try and
to punish him, demands the surrender." Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 289 (1902).
25. Treaty with Peru on Extradition, 18 Stat. part 3, 719 (1875).
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instead of following through with the extradition procedures, forcibly
abducted Ker to the United States.26 As a result of this irregular pro-
cedure, Ker contended that his rights under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment were violated 27 and that by virtue of the treaty with
Peru, he was entitled to a right of asylum there.28 Both arguments were
rejected by the Supreme Court, which held that due process of law was
complied with if the party was properly indicted and he was deprived of
no rights to which he was lawfully entitled at the trial.29 The Court, in
holding that no constitutional right had been violated, simply concluded
that the abduction was a "mere irregularity" in the manner in which Ker
was brought into custody and thus was insufficient to divest the state
court of jurisdiction. 30
The Court further held that the abduction without the consent of the
Government of Peru did not in itself violate the extradition treaty between
that country and the United States. Ker had argued that by virtue of the
treaty he acquired, by his residence in Peru, a right of asylum unless
properly extradited, a right which he could assert in the United States
courts. The Court, in rejecting this contention, stated that no treaty on
extradition had ever given an individual the right to escape justice. The
Court distinguished between the right of Peru to refuse extradition and
thus voluntarily give Ker a right of asylum, and his right to insist upon
security in such asylum.31 The Court asserted that Peru could have law-
fully surrendered Ker to Illinois even in the absence of a formal extra-
dition request. 32
Sixty-six years later, in Frisbie v. Collins,33 the Supreme Court
reiterated that forcible abduction of a defendant did not violate the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Frisbie involved an interstate,
rather than an international, kidnapping. While Frisbie was living in
26. 119 U.S. at 438.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 441.
29. Id. at 440.
30. Id. The Court stated that there might be some cases where it would be
appropriate to look at pre-trial conduct by the authorities as violative of due process;
however:
[F]or mere irregularities in the manner in which he may be brought into custody
of the law, we do not think he is entitled to say that he should not be tried at all
for the crime with which he is charged in a regular indictment. Id. at 440.
31. Id. at 443. An extradition treaty simply gives the legal right to the signing
states to demand extradition and the correlative duty to surrender. Factor v. Lauben-
heimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933). Therefore, an extradition treaty eliminates other
methods of apprehension only if it expressly so provides. Accord, United States v.
Unverzagt, 299 F. 1015 (W.D. Wash. 1924) (Defendant had no right of asylum in
Canada which would require a United States court to divest itself of jurisdiction due
to his abduction from that country).
32. 119 U.S. at 442.
33. 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
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Illinois, Michigan police forcibly seized, handcuffed, blackjacked, and
abducted him to Michigan to face trial for murder.
3 4
In a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Frisbie claimed that his con-
viction was a nullity because his abduction violated the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment and the Federal Kidnapping Act.aa The
court of appeals reversed the district court's denial of relief, on the grounds
that the Federal Kidnapping Act embodied a strong federal policy against
forcible abductions, and that no state could convict a defendant who was
seized in violation of the Act's provisions.36 On certiorari, the Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the sanctions set forth in the Federal Kid-
napping Act were the exclusive remedies for its violation, and that only
Congress could legitimately add to them.3 7 On the question of a violation
of the due process clause, the Supreme Court stated:
This Court has never departed from the rule announced in Ker v.
Illinois ... that the power of a court to try a person for crime is not
34. 342 U.S. at 520. There is an interstate extradition procedure specified in the
United States Constitution:
A person charged in any state with Treason, Felony, or other crimes, who shall
flee from Justice, and be found in another State shall on demand of the Executive
Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the
State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.
U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 2 cl. 2. See also 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181 et seq. (1970). There can
be problems with this method of apprehension of fugitives as the process can be slow
and cumbersome, the governor may refuse to act, and the offense may not be extra-
dictable.
The Fugitive Felon Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1073 (1970), authorizes federal agents
to return fugitives to the federal judicial district of the site of the crime for federal
prosecution.
35. 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1970). The Act provides in pertinent part:
a) Whoever knowingly transports in interstate or foreign commerce, any
person who has been unlawfully seized, confined, inveigled, decoyed, kid-
napped, abducted, or carried away and held for ransom or reward or
otherwise, except, in the case of a minor by a parent thereof, shall be
punished (1) by death if the kidnapped person has not been liberated
unharmed, and if the verdict of the jury shall so recommend, or (2) by
imprisonment for any term of years or for life, if the death penalty is
not imposed.
18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1970). This code section was amended in 1972 to extend "the
jurisdictional base to include acts committed within the special maritime, territorial,
and aircraft jurisdiction of the United States, and to include acts committed against
foreign officials and official guests, and struck out provisions relating to death penalty."
Comment to 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1970) as amended (Supp. III, 1973).
The reliance on the Federal Kidnapping Act by Frisbie was an attempt to
avoid the holding in Ker that similar treatment in an international abduction was
not a violation of due process. See notes 23-32 and accompanying text supra.
36. Collins v. Frisbie, 189 F.2d 464, 468 (6th Cir. 1951).
37. 342 U.S. at 523. See also The Supreme Court, 1951 Term, 61 HARV. L. REV.
89, 126-27 (1952). In Mahon v. Justice, 127 U.S. 700 (1888), a criminal defendant
argued that U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (see note 34 supra), prohibited the trial of
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impaired by the fact that he had been brought, within the court's
jurisdiction by reason of a "forcible abduction." No persuasive reasons
are now presented to justify overruling this line of cases. They rest
on the sound basis that due process of law is satisfied when one present
in court is convicted of crime after being fairly apprised of the charges
against him and after a fair trial in accordance with constitutional pro-
cedural safeguards.8
8
Both Ker and Frisbie involved Supreme Court review of the conduct
of state law enforcement officers, but the same doctrine has been applied by
lower federal courts to cases involving abduction by federal officers. The
argument that federal officers should be held to a higher standard of con-
duct than state officers had been uniformly rejected.39
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE Ker-Frisbie RULE
The Ker-Frisbie rule's justification lies in the notion that a balance
must be struck between conviction of the guilty and deterrence of mis-
conduct by law enforcement authorities. Since Frisbie was decided, the
concept of reversing criminal convictions because of pre-trial official mis-
conduct has gained wide acceptance. It remains to be determined whether
this development has undercut the basis for Ker-Frisbie.
anyone who was abducted into the jurisdiction in violation of the extradition procedure
set forth therein. In Mahon, the defendant was taken to Kentucky from West Vir-
ginia over the protest of the Governor of West Virginia. The Court held that the
extradition clause only bound the surrendering state to accede to the wishes of the
demanding state, and did not affect the jurisdiction of any courts of the former. 127
U.S. 705.
The construction by the Supreme Court of the Federal Kidnapping Act in
Frisbie was wholly consistent with this reasoning in Mahon. Accord, Lascelles v.
Georgia, 148 U.S. 537 (1893). See generally Scott, Criminal Jurisdiction, supra
note 1.
38. 342 U.S. at 522 (footnote omitted).
39. "While the court recognizes that the vitality of the Ker-Frisbie doctrine we
follow may be in doubt and that federal officers might be held to a higher standard of
conduct than their state counterparts, we will not strike it down." United States v.
Cotten, 471 F.2d 744, 748 n.ll (9th Cir. 1973). Since Mahon, federal courts have
uniformly declined to hold that a violation of a statute by federal law enforcement
authorities divests them of jurisdiction. See Robinson v. United States, 144 F.2d 392
(6th Cir. 1944) (Removal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 591 (1970)); Ex parte Lamar, 274 F.
160 (2d Cir. 1921) (same) ; United States ex rel. MacBlain v. Burke, 200 F.2d 616
(3d Cir. 1952) (Interstate Compact Act, 61 PuRDoN's PA. STAT. ANN. § 321 (Supp.
1951)). See also United States v. Hamilton, 460 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1972) (inter-
national abduction by Canadian border officers); United States ex rel. Calhoun v.
Twomey, 454 F.2d 326 (7th Cir. 1971) (interstate abduction).
The Toscanino opinion did not distinguish between the constitutional require-
ments of official behavior by state and federal officers, but did rely on the general
supervisory power of a federal appellate court to require district courts to adhere to
a standard more rigorous than the constitutional minimum in the area of illegal abduc-
tions. The validity of this pronouncement of policy, however, is very doubtful in view
of LuJan. See note 22 supra.
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The Ker-Frisbie rule may be justified on the grounds that the de-
fendant has suffered no harm by his abduction, and that only the state
whose sovereignty has been invaded has really been injured.4 0 In Mahon
v. Justice,41 however, the Governor of West Virginia requested the release
of a criminal defendant by the Commonwealth Act of Kentucky after his
abduction from West Virginia. The Governor, arguing that it was the
duty of the United States to secure each state's territorial sovereignty from
kidnappings perpetrated by other states, petitioned the United States Dis-
trict Court for Kentucky to afford the only means of compelling Mahon's
return, a writ of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court, reversing the grant of
the writ, ruled that there was no provision for compulsory return of a
person unlawfully abducted but held pursuant to lawful process for offenses
against the state to which he was abducted. It seems, therefore, that the
Ker-Frisbie rule applies even where the sovereign whose rights are vio-
lated demands the return of the defendant, and that both the defendant and
the injured state are without remedy.4 2
The primary justification for the Ker-Frisbie rule is that the act of
escaping from the jurisdiction by the defendant does not purge the offense.43
As stated in Frisbie "[t] here is nothing in the Constitution that requires a
court to permit a guilty person rightfully convicted to escape justice .... -44
According to the Supreme Court interpretation of the due process clause
at the time of both Ker and Frisbie, the defendant's rights were adequately
safeguarded if, after jurisdiction was obtained, customary and fair pro-
cedures were employed. Due process was, under this theory, only con-
cerned with constitutional violations which had a prejudicial effect upon
40. The only right denied by illegal abduction would be a formal extradition
hearing which does not inquire into the merits of the charge, but only establishes
that the person matches the one sought to be removed and that he has fled the demand-
ing state. Thus, if the defendant has indeed fled the demanding state, he has lost
nothing as a result of the abduction. See Illegal Abduction, supra note 1, at 299.
41. 127 U.S. 700 (1888). See also note 37 supra.
42. 1952 WASH. U.L.Q. 588, 589. See also State v. Brewster, 7 Vt. 118, 122
(1835). Mahon involved an interstate abduction only, and the court held that the
protest of the aggrieved state could not be redressed in federal court, as there was
no federal remedy. 127 U.S. at 705. However, in Lujan, the Second Circuit noted
that an international abduction might affect the jurisdiction of a court if the foreign
state protested. This statement supported the finding in Toscanino that an abduction
in violation of international law might be redressed by the federal courts under their
supervisory power. 500 F.2d at 278. Lujan specifically held, however, that the failure
of the foreign government to protest the abduction was fatal to the defendant's claim.
510 F.2d at 67.
After Lujan, it is still unclear whether the abduction of the defendant in
violation of international law, without any violation of individual rights, is sufficient to
divest the court of jurisdiction. See notes 117-140 and accompanying text infra.
43. This seems to be the defendant's biggest stumbling block. See Mahon v.
Justice, 127 U.S. 700, 711 (1888). See also Scott, Criminal Jurisdiction, supra note 1,
at 97; Note, Criminal Law - Personal Jurisdiction Obtained by Kidnapping, 5 U.
FLA. L. REV. 434 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Personal Jurisdiction].
44. 342 U.S. at 522.
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the guilt-determinative procedure of the trial.4 5 With this policy in mind,
it was clear that Ker and Frisbie decided that the abduction of a criminal
defendant was not material to the fairness of the trial and thus irrelevant
to the requirements of due process.46 Under the Ker-Frisbie analysis, there
is no justification for allowing pre-trial irregularities to void a conviction
unless the fairness of the guilt-determinative process is tainted thereby.4 7
Another justification which has been advanced in favor of the Ker-
Frisbie rule is that the act of abduction should not deprive the state of the
right to try the defendant because the abduction was beyond the scope of
the officers' authority, and therefore not attributable to the state.4S In
civil cases, jurisdiction over the defendant is not impaired by conduct
other than the plaintiff's; by analogy, the argument runs, the state's
power should only depend on its own actions. However, the officers who
engage in the unlawful activities are officials of the state, and the state
cannot act except through such individuals.4 9
The infelicity of this justification is most apparent in the area of
searches and seizures, where the courts have uniformly held that evidence
45. Id. The view that the manner of acquiring jurisdiction before trial was not
to be scrutinized under due process was based on the assumption that there was no
danger of convicting an innocent defendant. Violations of procedural rights during
trial and violations that affected the reliability of evidence were long viewed as vital
to the determination of guilt, and were scrutinized under due process. See, e.g., Powell
v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). See also Scott, Criminal Jurisdiction, supra note 1.
But see note 88 and accompanying text infra; Personal Jurisdiction, supra note 43.
46. "Occurrences prior to the trial which did not enter in any way into his convic-
tion are wholly beside the point." United States ex rel. Langer v. Ragen, 237 F.2d
827, 829 (7th Cir. 1956). See Sheldon v. Nebraska, 401 F.2d 342 (8th Cir. 1968);
Baxter v. Rhay, 268 F.2d 40, 44 (9th Cir. 1959) (held that the violation of a local
ordinance requiring that a prisoner must be brought before a magistrate without un-
necessary delay was not constitutionally required in state proceedings as the absence
of this procedure did not affect the outcome) ; United States ex rel. Sprosch v. Ragen,
246 F.2d 264, 265 (7th Cir. 1957); United States ex rel. Burgess v. Johnson, 323
F. Supp. 72, 75 (E.D. Mich. 1971); Golla v. Rhodes, 162 F, Supp. 589 (D. Del.
1958). See also Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U.S. 192 (1906). See generally Illegal
Abduction, supra note 1.
47. See United States ex rel. Orsini v. Reincke, 286 F. Supp. 974 (D. Conn.
1968).
48. See United States ex rel. Voight v. Toombs, 67 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1933).
49. In civil cases, the generally accepted rule is that "[a] state will not exercise
judicial jurisdiction, which has been obtained by fraud, or unlawful force, over a
defendant or his property." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICTS § 82 (1971). It
would seem that if a court will not exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant
brought into a state by the unlawful force or fraud of the plaintiff, it ought not to
exercise jurisdiction in a criminal case over a defendant who is brought into the state
by the unlawful force or fraud of the state's law enforcement agents. It is true that
no constitutional requirement mandates this result in civil cases, but the greater im-
portance of individual rights affected when the criminal process is invoked by the
state indicates that constitutional strictures might wisely be placed on the state's mis-
conduct. See generally Comment, Jurisdiction Over Persons Brought into a State by
Force or Fraud, 39 YALE L.J. 889 (1930).
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obtained as a result of an illegal search is inadmissible without regard to
whether the state itself authorized the search.50 It is difficult to see why
the state should be forced to bear the burden of its officers' wrongdoing in
an illegal search, but not in an illegal abduction.
The strength of the Ker-Frisbie rule has been demonstrated by the
application of the rule to situations other than those involving illegal abduc-
tions.51 The rule has been cited for the proposition that the circumstances
surrounding any arrest within the jurisdiction are immaterial to the court's
exercise of power.52 Using the same justification as that of the Ker-Frisbie
rule, it has been held that if the defendant is brought before a proper
officer, by proper authorities, to answer for a crime, he cannot assert a
violation of due process simply because he was arrested without a warrant
or previous complaint,5" or after an illegal confinement.54 Similarly, the
principle of the Ker-Frisbie rule has been applied to irregularities in the
procedure used in the extradition of a defendant. 5 Expectedly, the Ker-
50. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See also Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 382 (1914).
51. The Ker-Frisbie rule has been applied in support of a federal court's jurisdic-
tion over proceedings for forfeiture of smuggled goods, despite the fact that the seizure
by federal authorities was unlawful. United States v. Eight Boxes, Etc., 105 F.2d 896,
899 (2d Cir. 1939).
52. United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 158 (1923) (arrest
improper because it lacked probable cause); Guzman-Flores v. United States Imm.
and Nat. Serv., 496 F.2d 1245 (7th Cir. 1974) ; Sewell v. United States, 406 F.2d 1289,
1292 (8th Cir. 1969); McCord v. Henderson, 384 F.2d 135, 136 (6th Cir. 1967);
Evans v. United States, 325 F.2d 596, 602 (8th Cir. 1963) (warrant issued in violation
of F.R. Crim. P.) ; Vlissidis v. Anadell, 262 F.2d 398. 400 (7th Cir. 1959) ; United
States v. King, 335 F. Supp. 523, 553 (S.D. Calif. 1971); Deivease v. Cox, 327 F.
Supp. 652, 655 (W.D. Va. 1971); Howard v. Allgood, 272 F. Supp. 381, 384 (E.D.
La. 1967); Crawford v. Cox, 307 F. Supp. 732, 736 (W.D. Va. 1962) (arrest without
a warrant) ; Frye v. Settle, 168 F. Supp. 7, 11 (W.D. Miss. 1958) (failure to require
appearance before a U.S. Commissioner before appearance in U.S. District Court);
Virgin Islands v. Carrero, 139 F. Supp. 275, 278 (D.V.I. 1955) (illegal arrest without
a warrant for a misdemeanor not committed in the presence of the officer, defect held
to be cured by trial).
53. United States v. Washington, 253 F.2d 913, 916 (7th Cir. 1958).
54. Delana v. Crouse, 327 F.2d 693 (10th Cir. 1964). The court in Delana held
that illegal confinement unaccompanied by the obtaining of evidence later admitted
against the defendant does not vitiate a conviction. The court stated that although
related to the manner in which jurisdiction was obtained, Frisbie stood for the more
general proposition "that precharge seizure, control and detention by state authorities
does not in itself provide grounds for relief in federal court." Id. at 694.
55. United States v. Caramian, 468 F.2d 1370 (5th Cir. 1972); United States
ex rel. Calhoun v. Twomey, 454 F.2d 326, 328 (7th Cir. 1971) (failure to comply
with pre-return hearings under the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, Iowa Code
Ann. § 759.10 (1950)) ; Bacon v. United States, 449 F2d 933 (9th Cir. 1971) ; Tynan
v. Eyman, 371 F.2d 764, 766 (9th Cir. 1967); Nance v. Paderick, 368 F. Supp. 547,
550 (W.D. Va. 1973) (deprivation of counsel at the extradition proceedings) ; United
States ex rel. Hunt v. Russell, 285 F. Supp. 765, 767 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (failure to
provide counsel at hearing before being returned under the United States-Bolivia
extradition treaty).
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Frisbie rule has been held applicable to all situations involving kidnap-
pings,5 6 notwithstanding the fact that the defendant had escaped from
prison or violated probation of another state,5 7 was abducted from another
jurisdiction's jail,58 was fraudulently induced to waive extradition,59 or
that his presence was secured by deception or trickery.60 Historically,
therefore, it is clear that the Ker-Frisbie rule has been widely accepted
and applied to situations outside the strict facts of the two cases. It has
been stated that the rule is so well accepted that it is not open to question. 1
ATTACKS ON THE Ker-Frisbie RULE
In more recent years, however, the principal rationale behind the Ker-
Frisbie doctrine has been questioned and significantly eroded. Some con-
tend that the rule itself is still applied only because of its historical accept-
ance. 62 The question which is sharply raised after Toscanino and LuJan
56. United States v. Vicars, 467 F.2d 452, 455 (5th Cir. 1972); United States
ex rel. Kelley v. Maroney, 414 F.2d 1228 (3d Cir. 1969) ; Bullis v. Hocker, 409 F.2d
1380, 1382 (9th Cir. 1969); Hobson v. Crouse, 332 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1964) ; Cook
v. Kern, 330 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1964); Hanovich v. Sacks, 290 F.2d 799 (6th Cir.
1961); Devine v. Hank, 287 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1961); Overman v. United States,
281 F.2d 497, 500 (6th Cir. 1960); United States ex rel. Moore v. Martin, 273 F.2d
344, 345 (2d Cir. 1959); Ragavage v. United States, 272 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1959);
Hardy v. United States, 250 F.2d 580, 582 (8th Cir. 1959); United States ex rel.
Master v. Baldi, 198 F.2d 113, 116 (3d Cir. 1952) ; Crow v. Coiner, 323 F. Supp. 555,
557 (N.D. W.Va. 1971); Johnson v. Buie, 312 F. Supp. 1349, 1351 (W.D. Miss.
1970); Hinkle v. Lowe, 309 F. Supp. 487 (E.D. Ark. 1969); United States ex rel.
Taylor v. Barmiller, 199 F. Supp. 115 (E.D. Pa. 1961); Ryan v. Tinsley, 182 F.
Supp. 130 (D. Colo. 1959); Crawford v. Lydick, 179 F. Supp. 211, 214 (W.D. Mich.
1959) ; Smith v. Mosier, 148 F. Supp. 638, 639 (W.D. Mich. 1957) ; Pebley v. Knotts,
95 F. Supp. 683, 686 (N.D. W.Va. 1951); Hatfield v. Warden of State Prison of
Southern Michigan, 88 F. Supp. 690, 692 (E.D. Mich. 1950) ; United States v. Insull,
8 F. Supp. 310 (N.D. Ill. 1934).
57. Strand v. Schmittroth, 251 F.2d 590, 600 (9th Cir. 1957); United States
ex rel. Humphries v. Hunt, 15 F. Supp. 608, 611 (W.D.N.Y. 1936).
58. Bistram v. United States, 253 F.2d 610, 613 (8th Cir. 1958).
59. Blankenship v. Peyton, 295 F. Supp. 16 (W.D. Va. 1969); United States
ex rel. Cooper v. Reincke, 219 F. Supp. 733, 738 (D. Conn. 1963).
60. Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U.S. 192 (1906). See Scott, Criminal Jurisdiction,
supra note 1.
61. Sheehan v. Huff, 142 F.2d 81 (D.C. Cir. 1944); Ex parte Lopez, 6 F. Supp.
342 (S.D. Tex. 1934). See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119 (1975).
62. In the recent case of United States v. Edmons, 432 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1970),
Judge Friendly stated:
We do not find Frisbie . . . and its predecessors . . . to be a truly persuasive
analogy. These cases were decided before the Fourth Amendment as such was
held applicable to the states .... and thus rested only on general considerations of
due process.... Whether the Court would now adhere to them must be regarded
as questionable.
Id. at 583 (footnote omitted). Accord, Brooks v. Blackledge, 353 F. Supp. 955 (W.D.
Va. 1973). See also United States v. Cotten, 471 F.2d 744, 748 nll (9th Cir. 1973)
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is whether the rule can stand in light of the revolution in the notion of due
process which has occurred since the Frisbie decision more than twenty
years ago.
The Ker-Frisbie rule has been under attack especially since the
Supreme Court's decision in Mapp v. Ohio,63 which held that the fourth
amendment's strictures, including the exclusionary rule,64 were binding on
the states. Mapp seemed to reject the rationale that convicting the guilty
was more important than condemning and deterring illegal official mis-
conduct. 65 Additionally, commentators have vigorously attacked the Ker-
Frisbie rule ever since the Frisbie decision, primarily on grounds that it
was inconsistent with the exclusionary rule.
66
The change in attitude signaled by Mapp and other cases has been
described as a "constitutional revolution. ' 67 It is no longer true that a fair
trial is all that is necessary to satisfy the due process requirement. The
government is now prevented from using the fruits of its unconstitutional
conduct.
(recognized that the vitality of the doctrine may be in doubt, but nonetheless accepted
it) ; United States v. Hamilton, 460 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1972); United States ex rel.
Calhoun v. Twomey, 454 F.2d 326 (7th Cir. 1971); Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d
993 (9th Cir. 1971). But see United States v. Herrera, 504 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1974) ;
United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Quesada,
512 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1975); see also In re David, 390 F. Supp. 52 (E.D. Ill.
1975); United States v. Marzeno, 388 F. Supp. 906 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
63. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
64. In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), the Court held that it was
not permissible for the government to introduce evidence illegally seized in a federal
criminal trial. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), held that the Weeks rule was
merely one of evidence, not a constitutional mandate and thus not obligatory on the
states. Mapp overruled Wolf, holding that the exclusionary rule was applicable to
the states under the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. "The cases [Ker and
Frisbie] were decided before the Fourth Amendment as such was held applicable
to the states .... and thus rested only on general considerations of due process ... "
Brooks v. Blackledge, 353 F. Supp. 955, 957 (W.D. Va. 1973). See Pitler, "The
Fruit of the Poisonous Tree" Revisited and Shepardized, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 579,
599-601 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Pitler].
65. "The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free.
Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own
laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." 367 U.S. at 659.
See also Virgin Islands v. Ortiz, 427 F.2d 1043, 1047 n.9 (3d Cir. 1973); in condemn-
ing the police conduct, the court suggested that "federal courts can impose higher
standards of conduct on federal officers . . . through the exercise of [their] supervisory
power." See also Pitler, supra note 64, at 600.
66. The Ker-Frisbie rule was generally attacked as inappropriate, but especially
in federal courts where the Supreme Court may exercise its supervisory power to
require lower courts to refuse jurisdiction. One commentator suggested that the
practical basis for the Frisbie decision was the Court's reluctance to overturn a doc-
trine which was approved by an overwhelming number of states. Allen, Due Process
and State Criminal Procedures: Another Look, 48 N.W.U.L. REv. 16 (1952); Scott,
Criminal Jurisdiction, supra note 1; Pitler, supra note 64. See also Annot., 165 A.L.R.
947, 958-61 (1946).
67. Griswold, The Due Process Revolution and Confrontation, 119 U. PA. L.
REV. 711 (1971).
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It may be argued that the erosion of Frisbie was evident two months
prior to its pronouncement. In Rochin v. California,68 the Supreme Court
concluded that the manner by which the state obtained evidence leading to
the defendant's conviction "shocked the conscience" and thus was a viola-
tion of due process.6° In Rochin, police had entered the open door of de-
fendant's apartment, burst through the bedroom door, and saw Rochin
swallow something. Upon failing to force the defendant to cough up the
swallowed items, the police delivered Rochin to a hospital, where, at their
insistence, a doctor pumped his stomach. Two. capsules containing mor-
phine were recovered.70 The Supreme Court, reversing the state courts'
determination, held that the official conduct was so reprehensible that
notions of due process and fundamental fairness required the exclusion of
any evidence obtained thereby. The Court said that the Constitution re-
quired that convictions obtained by methods offending "a sense of justice"71
must be overturned:
Due process of law is a summarized constitutional guarantee of
respect for those personal immunities which as Mr. Justice Cardozo
twice wrote for the court are "so rooted in the traditions and consci-
ence of our people as to be ranked as fundamental," Snyder v. Com-
monwealth of Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 ... or are "implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty." Palko v. State of Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 325 .... 72
In Toscanino, the defendant suffered similar brutality at the hands
of the government. The government allegedly tortured Toscanino by
knocking him unconscious, drugging him and interrogating him with the
use of torture.73 As stated in Lujan, "the particular circumstances of the
abduction, if Toscanino's claims are true, represent government conduct
appropriately condemned as most inhuman." 74 Accordingly, "there should
be no constitutional difference between a trial using reliable evidence
68. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
69. Id. at 172.
70. Id. at 166.
71. Id. at 173.
72. Id. at 169.
73. 500 F.2d at 269-70. Toscanino's torture consisted of denial of sleep and food
for days at a time; he was kept alive by intravenous feedings precisely equal to an
amount necessary to sustain life. He was forced to walk a hallway for seven to eight
hours at a time. When he would not answer questions, metal pliers were used to pinch
his fingers, fluid was flushed into his eyes, nose and anal passage, and electrodes
shooting electricity throughout his body were attached to his earlobes, toes and genitals.
All of this allegedly took place in the presence of an official of the United States
Department of Justice, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, and with the
knowledge of the United States government and the United States Attorney for the
Eastern District of New York. Finally, he was drugged and placed on a flight to
New York and arrested on the aircraft as it passed over the United States.
74. 510 F.2d at 64.
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brutally obtained and a proceeding against a defendant brutally obtained.
7
The court in Lujan, while accepting Rochin's application to Toscanino,76
distinguished the treatment of Lujan, stating that "the government conduct
of which he complains pales by comparison with that alleged by Tos-
canino." 77 The court held that the vital elements of torture, brutality, terror
or custodial interrogation present in Toscanino were crucial in the con-
version of "an abduction which is simply illegal into one which sinks to a
violation of due process." 78 On the other hand, it could be argued that the
forcible abduction itself is sufficiently tainted with brutal governmental
conduct to fit within the Rochin test.79 If this is true, then Lujan's inter-
pretation of Toscanino is erroneous. As a result, the only consistent
reading of Rochin, Ker and Frisbie, would confirm LuJan's holding that
a kidnapping and abduction standing alone are not so offensive and brutal
so as to constitute a violation of due process.
But Rochin, to the extent that it interprets the advancing notions of
due process to require scrutiny of the entire course of the proceedings
that result in a convicton, appears to be inconsistent with the Ker and
Frisbie holdings that a court will not look into the manner in which juris-
diction over the defendant was acquired. 0 In addition, due to the chang-
ing concept of due process, the focus is no longer solely on the integrity
of the guilt-determinative process, which would limit scrutiny of pre-trial
events to those which impair the ability of the court to reach a correct
decision. In Rochin, the focus was solely on the conduct of the police.8 '
The Rochin principle of exclusion was extended to include all viola-
tions of the constitutional right guaranteeing freedom from unreasonable
searches and seizures in the landmark case of Mapp v. Ohio,8 2 which held
the exclusionary rule applicable to the states through the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment:
The effects of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to
punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the
sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and
75. The Supreme Court, 1951 Term, 66 HARv. L. Ruv. 89, 127 (1952) (foot-
note omitted). There is some question whether Rochin stands for the proposition
that conduct as reprehensible as that shown leads to divestment of jurisdiction of the
court to try the defendant, or whether the evidence so obtained is rendered inadmissible.
If the latter, Rochin may easily be distinguished from Toscanino, on the ground that
no illegally obtained evidence was used at Toscanino's trial. It is submitted that no
such distinction may logically be made. Conduct so inhuman as that which occurred
in Toscanino or Rochin should appropriately be condemned regardless of what advan-
tages are obtained thereby.
76. 510 F.2d at 66.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See note 75 and accompanying text supra.
80. 342 U.S. at 169.
81. Id.
82. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental
law of the land.88
The Mapp Court accepted the proposition that the Weeks exclusionary
rule was not a rule of evidence but of constitutional origin8 4 and rejected
the holding in Wolf v. Colorado5 that other means of protecting fourth
amendment rights were adequate. Mapp, in supporting the exclusionary
rule and recognizing that as a result of it "[t]he criminal is to go free
because the constable has blundered," held that the imperative of judicial
integrity outweighed this consideration." As a result, the Mapp Court
concluded that the due process clause cannot "be revocable at the whim
of any police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses
to suspend its enjoyment."87 Therefore, it can be said that the exclusionary
rule, focusing on the conduct of the government, has, in most instances,
nothing whatever to do with the fair determination of guilt,8 8 which is an
apparent contradiction to the Ker-Frisbie approach. The exclusionary
rule's purposes are to deter disregard of constitutional rights and protect
the integrity of the courts.
While the Mapp principle is relatively clear, its effect on the vitality
of the Ker-Frisbie rule is not. The desire to protect the integrity of the
courts certainly extends to abductions in violation of law,8 9 but the remedy
83. Id. at 648, quoting Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914). The
exclusionary rule was already binding on federal courts. It is Mapp's expansion of
the concept of due process which has direct bearing on Toscanino.
84. Id. at 643.
85. 338 U.S. 25, 30 (1949).
86. 367 U.S. at 659, quoting from People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E.
585, 587 (1926). Mr. Justice Brandeis in his dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928), agreed, stating:
Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it
teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the government
becomes a law breaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become
a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.
Id. at 485 (dissenting opinion).
87. 367 U.S. at 660.
[If the exclusionary rule is not to be employed, an individual's] right to be secure
against such searches and seizures is of no value, and . . . might as well be
stricken from the Constitution.
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. at 393. See also Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
88. Both Mapp and Rochin are examples of exclusion of completely reliable in-
formation. See note 45 supra.
89. "[C]onviction in the federal courts, the foundation of which is evidence
obtained in disregard of liberties deemed fundamental by the Constitution, cannot
stand." McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 339 (1943). Mr. Justice Brandeis
stated in his dissent in Olmstead:
The door of a court is not barred because the plaintiff has committed a crime.
The confirmed criminal is as much entitled to redress as his most virtuous fellow
citizen; no record of crime, however long, makes one an outlaw. The court's aid
is denied only when he who seeks it has violated the law in connection with the
very transaction as to which he seeks legal redress. Then aid is denied despite
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of "exclusion" of the defendant -from -a case because his arrival in the
jurisdiction was irregular seems much more drastic than the exclusion of
evidence. In effect, Lujan distinguished between illegal and unconstitu-
tional governmental misconduct. One explanation for this distinction is the
drastic remedy required if a constitutional violation is found. 90
However, in the area of entrapment, courts have embraced just such
a drastic remedy. Although the traditional basis for a dismissal of the
indictment in an entrapment case is the lack of predisposition on the de-
fendant's part to commit a crime, 91 there has been considerable support for
the proposition that the proper basis for the defense is the illegal conduct
of the police.92 In the recent case of United States v. Russell,93 the
Supreme Court, while holding that the government activity involved did
not amount to entrapment, 94 warned that:
... [W]e may some day be presented with a situation in which the
conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process
the defendant's wrong. It is denied in order to maintain respect for law; in order
to promote confidence in the administration of justice; in order to preserve the
judicial process from contamination. The rule is one, not of action, but of in-
action. It is sometimes spoken of as a rule of substantive law. But it extends to
matters of procedure as well. A defense may be waived. It is waived, when not
pleaded. But the objection that the plaintiff comes with unclean hands will be
taken by the court itself. It will be taken despite the wish to the contrary of all
the parties to the litigation. The court protects itself.
Decency, security, and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be
subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen. In a
government of laws, existence of the government will be imperiled if it fails to
observe the law scrupulously.
277 U.S. at 484-85 (footnotes omitted). See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
90. See notes 100-16 and accompanying text infra. It is difficult to conceive that
"simply illegal" conduct is not a "violation of due process." 510 F.2d at 66. In fact,
the Lujan court failed to find a violation of any constitutional right. In order to do
so, the court totally ignored discussion of the fourth amendment right of freedom from
unlawful seizure of the person. The most logical explanation for the court's refusal to
find any violation of a constitutional right was their aversion to the extreme remedy
of divestment of jurisdiction. Id. at 68 n.9.
91. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973) ; Sherman v. United States,
356 U.S. 369 (1958) ; Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
92. See 356 U.S. at 382 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); 287 U.S. at 451 (Roberts,
J., concurring).
93. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
94. In Russell, the defendant was participating in an illegal drug manufacturing
operation. The federal agent investigating the case infiltrated the operation, and
agreed to supply an essential ingredient, which was legally obtainable but very difficult
to find. When the ingredient was procured, the defendant used it to make the drug.
In sum, there was no doubt that the government agent had not prompted an innocent
person to commit a crime, but had simply supplied the tools. In upholding the con-
viction, the Supreme Court noted that the defense of entrapment was not based on the
Constitution, but the inferred intent of Congress to refrain from punishing conduct
that was not induced in the defendant's own mind, but instead at the behest of the
government. 411 U.S. at 433.
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principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial
processes to obtain a conviction .... 95
The Court's warning implies that the defendant's guilty predisposition may
not preclude a finding of a due process violation, and therefore, the court-
room doors should be closed for purposes of conviction when the crime
is the result of sufficiently outrageous and illegal police conduct.
Mapp and Russell indicate that the basis of the Ker-Frisbie rule has
been at least partially eroded. In light of the shocking conduct involved in
Toscanino, the decision in that case recognized this erosion and properly
denied jurisdiction over the defendant on due process grounds. It may be
that any abduction by government officials would be sufficiently "shock-
ing" to deny jurisdiction.98
Nevertheless, a kidnapping without more is difficult to fit within
Rochin, which held that police conduct which "shocks the conscience" is a
violation of due process, since Frisbie itself was decided after Rochin and
made no mention of the earlier decision.9 7 More recent cases, such as Mapp
and Russell, however, suggest that the Supreme Court's attitude toward
"forcible abductions" has changed, and that very little may be left of the
original Ker-Frisbie rule.98
95. Id. at 431-32. In addition, Russell cited two lower court decisions which had
found entrapment regardless of the defendant's predisposition in cases of governmental
illegality. United States v. Bueno, 447 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Chisum, 312 F. Supp. 1307 (C.D. Calif. 1970). 411 U.S. at 427-28. See also Scott,
Criminal Jurisdiction, supra note 1, at 103.
96. This argument has been specifically rejected by two circuits. In Hobson v.
Crouse, 332 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1964), the counsel for the defendant argued that the
Frisbie rule had been impliedly overruled by Mapp and that accordingly "all 'shortcut
methods of law enforcement' are forbidden." The court held that nothing in Mapp
either impels or encourages "the bold step suggested by counsel." Id. at 561-62. In
United States v. Cotten, 471 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1973), the court, as in the Hobson
case, found nothing in Mapp, Rochin or Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),
which implied that the expanded scope of protection afforded to accused persons by
the fifth and fourth amendments would preclude trial of the accused by a court of
competent jurisdiction.
97. The Supreme Court could have used the Rochin rationale in Frisbie seemingly
because of the fact that some violence was perpetrated on Frisbie during his abduction.
342 U.S. at 520. This seems to indicate that, at the time, the Supreme Court had
determined Frisbie to be consistent with Rochin. Evidently, then, Ker and Frisbic
have been eroded due to the trend of due process cases subsequent to Frisbie such that
the amount of force sufficient to violate due process may have decreased significantly.
98. This was apparently the conclusion of the Second Circuit in Toscanino in
denying the jurisdiction of the district court over the defendant if the facts alleged
were proved. The court did not dwell on the presence of torture, and, logically, the
post-seizure torture did not bear any causal connection with the obtaining of jurisdic-
tion over Toscanino. Nevertheless, the Lujan opinion distinguished Toscanino because
of the presence of torture in the earlier case. For the same reading of Toscanino, see
United States v. Marzano, 388 F. Supp. 906 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
Lujan's reading of Toscanino is improbable since the Toscanino court
rested its decision not only on the due process clause but also on the fourth amend-
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THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY FOR A DUE PROCESS VIOLATION
Another important question raised by the Toscanino decision is the
remedy to be applied once a due process violation is found. In Toscanino,
the court simply mandated divestment of jurisdiction over the person upon
finding a due process violation, and did not consider the full implications
of this remedy.99 The full consequences of the remedy of divestment of
jurisdiction remain to be determined. The court might send the defendant
back to the jurisdiction from which he was abducted and then permit com-
mencement of formal extradition proceedings. In the case of an interstate
abduction, the court, upon returning the defendant, may request his ren-
dition; to obtain the same results, the court can simply set him free, give
him a head start and then permit pursuit. In other words, if the presence
of the defendant can be obtained independently of the prior illegal seizure,
then there would be no need to prohibit a trial of the defendant. This
would be consistent with the exclusionary rule applying to illegal seizure
of evidence, which permits the use of evidence if it is acquired independently
of police misconduct. 00
It may be doubted, however, whether any arrests following an illegal
abduction would be wholly separate and unaffected by the taint of the
original kidnapping. This leads to the conclusion that a finding of an un-
constitutional abduction must result in most cases in complete immunity
from prosecution of the defendant.101 If this were not the case, the divest-
ment would simply be dictating an unreasonable waste of time for the
government with no certain benefit to the defendant, thus making the
ment. 500 F.2d at 275. Discussion of the fourth amendment would have been im-
material to the interpretation of the Toscanino decision given by the Lujan court.
Moreover, it is difficult to maintain that the true basis of the Toscanino decision was
the presence of torture, because the court phrased the issue in terms of kidnapping and
abduction and not governmental brutality. This seems especially noteworthy, since
the court in Toscanino, in attempting to distinguish Ker and Frisbie in order to avoid
a strict overruling of those decisions, failed to mention this basic distinction.
Since the Toscanino decision was handed down, the Supreme Court has
undercut some of the force behind the argument that Ker and Frisbie no longer
represent the majority view on the Court. In Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975),
the Court in dictum cited both cases with apparent approval. Id. at 119.
99. 500 F.2d at 275.
100. The basis for requiring an independent source is that the court should not
permit what can not be legally done in one step to be done in two. In Silverthorne
Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920), the Court did not permit the
government to subpoena from the victim of an unlawful search and seizure the very
documents illegally seized and then returned pursuant to court order. Accordingly, it
would seem, for example, that the government should not be permitted to retu.rn
Toscanino to Uruguay and then demand his extradition.
101. If there is no truly independent source, the immunity must encompass all
illegal conduct prior to the divestment over which that court would have jurisdiction.
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exclusionary rule a mere procedural device rather than a real deterrent
to police misconduct, and a means of protecting "judicial integrity." 10 2
The court in LuJan accepted the conclusion that application of the
exclusionary rule to require divestment of jurisdiction would usually
confer complete immunity on the defendant. 10 3 In determining if com-
plete immunity is the proper remedy, the competing interests of the public
and those of the individual defendant must be balanced. Society's interest
may be best served by allowing the defendant to go free as a means of
protecting judicial integrity and thus everyone's individual liberties. How-
ever, this interest should be balanced against the principle that the guilty
should be punished to maintain the public confidence which would be
betrayed when an obviously guilty criminal escapes punishment.1 4 The
former argument has prevailed in cases involving illegal searches and
seizures' 0 5 and electronic surveillance.'0 6 There are important distinctions
between the application of the rule in cases of wiretapping and searches
and seizures and its application to personal jurisdiction. The issue in
previous cases involving the exclusionary rule concerned the admissibility
of evidence. 107 Excluded evidence went to proving the defendant's guilt
or innocence. In cases of abduction of defendants, the "exclusion" is im-
material to proof of guilt or innocence. Only the ultimate power to con-
vict was procured by the illegal conduct, not the means of establishing
guilt or innocence. The police, however, have profited by their illegal kid-
napping just as in the case of illegally seized evidence. Since the rationale
of the exclusionary rule is deterrence of police misconduct rather than
simply a notion of fairness of the outcome of the trial, the exclusionary
remedy should apply. It is true that application here is a more severe
remedy than in cases of exclusion of evidence, but according to Toscanino,
in those cases in which mere evidence was excluded it was unnecessary to:
invoke any other sanction to insure that an ultimate conviction would
not rest on governmental illegality. Where suppression of evidence
102. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 448 (1970); Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
103. This important conclusion was relegated to a discussion in a footnote. 510
F.2d at 68 n.9.
104. See People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926). See also McNabb
v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943); Wigmore, Using Evidence Obtained by Illegal
Search and Seizure, 8 A.B.A.J. 479 (1922).
No one can deny either the inherent justice of bringing criminals to trial or the
importance of upholding the integrity of state prohibitions of criminal conduct,
but to encourage law enforcement officers to violate the law themselves is hardly
a sound means of effectuating these desirable ends.
Note, Criminal Law: Personal Jurisdiction Obtained by Kidnapping, 5 U. FLA. L.
REv. 434, 436 (1952) (footnote omitted).
105. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383 (1914).
106. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
107. See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
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will not suffice, however, we must be guided by the underlying prin-
ciple that the government should be denied the right to exploit its
own illegal conduct and when an accused is kidnapped, tortured and
forcibly brought within the jurisdiction, the court's acquisition of
power over his person represents the fruits of the government's ex-
ploitation of its own misconduct.08
The use of an exclusionary rule to reverse convictions because jurisdiction
has been unlawfully obtained must make theoretical sense in terms of
deterring inhumane or otherwise illegal conduct. In evaluating the remedy,
however, it is necessary to draw a line where logic interferes with the
criminal process without any meaningful gain to society. In other words,
perhaps other direct methods of dealing with the shocking conduct of the
police would be sufficient and thus the severe remedy of exclusion and
immunity from prosecution could be avoided.
Direct methods of preventing illegal police conduct have proved
largely illusory. 10 9 One direct remedy available is disciplinary action by
,the state against the police officers, including prosecution of the police
officer for a criminal abduction. But as Mr. Justice Murphy said in
Wolf v. Colorado:
Self scrutiny is a lofty ideal, but its exaltation reaches new heights if
we expect a District Attorney to prosecute himself or his Associates
for well-meaning violations of the search and seizure clause during a
raid the District Attorney or his associates have ordered." 0
Civil actions in most cases are also fruitless. While the criminal defendant
might recover against a police officer, the officer's economic situation pre-
vents, in most instances, collection of a large judgment."' A suit against
the offending state or municipality usually is prohibited on grounds of
sovereign immunity." 2 Therefore it is evident that direct remedies pro-
vide no real benefit for the criminal defendant; the result is a lack of in-
centive on the part of the police to refrain from violating individual liberties.
Perhaps an exclusionary rule is unnecessary because kidnapping of
criminal defendants may not be a very serious problem. The court in
108. 500 F.2d at 275 (emphasis added).
109. Illegal Abduction, supra note 1, at 295.
110. 338 U.S. 25, 42 (1949) (dissenting opinion). See Plumb, Illegal Enforcement
of the Law, 24 CORNELL L.Q. 337, 388 (1939).
111. L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES FRom ARREST To APPEAL 28 (1947);
Hall, The Law of Arrest in Relation to Contemporary Social Problems, 3 U. CHI.
L. REV. 345 (1936) [hereinafter cited as Hall, The Law of Arrest].
112. Hall, The Law of Arrest, supra note 111, at 348. See also 16 E. MCQUILLAN,
TIE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 53.80e (3d ed. 1963). The reluctance of a
civil jury to award damages to a convicted defendant also would go a long way toward
defeating the remedy.
In People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955), the Supreme Court
of California concluded that direct criminal, administrative and civil remedies fail
completely to secure compliance with the constitutional provision and as a result
adopted the exclusionary rule. According to Mapp, the experiences of California
were shared by those of other states. 367 U.S. at 652.
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Lujan, in holding that divestment of jurisdiction was unnecessary in cases
of ordinary illegal conduct, stated that "the financial cost of the operation,
the possibility of alienating other nations, and the risk that the kidnappers
would be prosecuted in a foreign territory for their offenses suggest that
the likelihood of numerous violations is not real.""h 3 The court stated that
if this assumption should prove ill-founded, its conclusions as to the lack
of need for application of the exclusionary rule to cases of abduction un-
accompanied by torture or brutality might be reconsidered. 114
As previously noted, however, according to numerous reports, kid-
napping and abduction have greatly increased as a method of combatting
drug conspiracies.115 The cost, though high, has not been prohibitive in
worldwide drug conspiracies, as evidenced by the efforts of the government
to end the conspiracy in which both Toscanino and Lujan allegedly par-
ticipated. Even if the cost is prohibitive in most instances, constitutional
rights should not be dependent upon how "big" a crime is involved.
Finally, the possibility of alienating other nations is remote, since in most
cases the foreign government cooperates or acquiesces in the kidnapping.
It is therefore clear that a judicial solution to the problem is necessary, and
divestment of jurisdiction seems to be the only remedy, although its severity
indicates that it should be used sparingly."(
113. 510 F2d at 68 n.9.
114. Id. Furthermore, any such discussion of the exclusionary rule simply speaks
to the remedy, and is irrelevant to whether a constitutional right was violated. This
indicates that perhaps the court did not wish to declare that Lujan's treatment violated
his due process rights because they did not wish to divest the court of jurisdiction.
115. See note 1 supra.
116. It is important to determine exactly what constitutional grounds are sufficient
for the divestment of jurisdiction. The court in Toscanino did not clearly base its
decision on the due process clause; the fourth amendment was also mentioned briefly.
See 500 F.2d at 275.
If the exclusionary rule as applied to divestment of jurisdiction is based upon
the fourth amendment rather than a violation of due process, then the same standards
used to exclude evidence under the fourth amendment should be applied to the ex-
clusion of jurisdiction. The standard under the fourth amendment includes errors in
judgment as well as blatantly illegal conduct of the police. Applying this standard,
irregularities unaccompanied by "outrageous" conduct in extradition as well as ordi-
nary illegal arrests unaccompanied by any "fruits" of the illegality would result in
divestment of jurisdiction. The maze of problems thus created by the fourth amend-
ment analysis of the Toscanino decision largely accounted for the severe limitation
of the decision in Lujan. By basing Toscanino solely on the due process clause,
different standards could be applied than for exclusion of evidence under the fourth
amendment thereby preventing any extension of the Toscanino result to ordinary
illegal arrests unaccompanied by police brutality. In light of the Lujan decision, such
an extension is now precluded, at least in the Second Circuit.
Toscanino as interpreted by Lujan would arguably preclude a federal court
from exercising jurisdiction over any defendant whose arrest was associated with
gross police misconduct, whether or not an abduction was involved. But the court
stated in Toscanino:
[We view due process as now requiring a court to divest itself of jurisdiction
over the person of a defendant where it has been acquired as the result of the
1975]
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INTERNATIONAL LAW CONSEQUENCES OF ABDUCTIONS
A second theory advanced for the denial of jurisdiction in Toscanino
was the alleged violation of international law.'1 7 This theory was also
alluded to in Lu/an, but neither case truly came to grips with the issue of
whether a federal court must divest itself of jurisdiction solely because the
defendant was brought before the court as a result of a violation of inter-
national law.118
That the court in Tdscanino found a violation of international law in
the kidnapping and abduction of Toscanino distinguishes the case from
Ker, Frisbie and Lujan.119 In Ker, the only revelant treaty in effect at the
time was the extradition treaty between the United States and Peru.
An extradition treaty merely gives the parties a right to the surrender of
a fugitive upon proper request. Unless an extradition treaty specifically
eliminates other methods of apprehension, which was not true in the treaty
involved in Ker, failure to request extradition and a subsequent abduction
is not a violation of the treaty. Accordingly, the Court in Ker held that
the defendant's kidnapping was not in violation of the Peruvian extra-
dition treaty. 120
Toscanino involved an abduction which was allegedly in direct viola-
tion of two international treaties which secured Uruguay's territorial sov-
ereignty, the United Nations Charter and the Charter of the Organization
of American States.1 1
government's deliberate, unnecessary and unreasonable invasion of the accused's
constitutional rights.
500 F.2d at 275. See LaFrance v. Bohlinger, 499 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1974), where the
court recognized the applicability of the Toscanino rationale to police conduct resulting
in a coerced confession.
117. 500 F.2d at 276.
118. Toscanino hints that such a violation would be sufficient to justify divestment
of jurisdiction, but couches much of its discussion of international law in terms of
due process, thereby obscuring the issue of whether a violation of international law
alone is sufficient. The requirements necessary to establish a violation of international
law were discussed in Lujan, but since the court found no violation, no determination
as to the consequences of a breach was necessary. See 510 F.2d at 68.
119. See notes 23-32 and accompanying text supra.
120. In further explanation of its finding that no violation of a treaty occurred,
the court in Ker stated that where the defendant's removal is extra-legal, the de-
fendant cannot raise an issue of the illegality in his removal unless the language of
that treaty supports a construction that citizens of each country have a right of asylum
in the other, including the right of a fugitive to be free from acts of force. 119 U.S.
at 441.
121. U.N. CHARTER art. 2:
The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1,
shall act in accordance with the following Principles:
(4) All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
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A factual situation analogous to that in Toscanino was presented in
Cook v. United States.122 In Cook, the United States seized a British
vessel in violation of an Anglo-American shipping treaty. The Court
divested itself of jurisdiction over the ship because under the treaty, the
United States lacked the power to seize and thereby subject the ship to
its laws. 123 Therefore, a treaty by which the United States disclaimed any
authority to seize persons doubtless would similarly divest an American
court of jurisdiction. 124 The court in Cook distinguished Ker on this
ground:
The objection to the seizures is not that it was wrongful merely be-
cause made by one upon whom the Government had not conferred
authority to seize at the place where the seizure was made. The
objection is that the Government itself lacked power to seize, since by
the Treaty it had imposed a territorial limitation upon its own
authority.... Our Government, lacking power to seize, lacked power,
because of the Treaty, to subject the vessel to our laws. To hold that
adjudication may follow a wrongful seizure would go far to nullify the
purpose and effect of the Treaty. 25
Since Toscanino involved direct violation of international treaties securing
Uruguay's sovereignty, Cook indicates that a federal court would have no
power to try Toscanino unless the abduction was not an unlawful invasion
of the territorial sovereignty of Uruguay. 126
of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations.
O.A.S. CHARTER art. 17:
The territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the object, even temporarily,
of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another State,
directly or indirectly on any grounds whatever. No territorial acquisitions or
special advantages obtained either by force or by other means of coercion shall
be recognized.
122. 288 U.S. 102 (1933).
123. Id. at 121. The Cook case followed the decision in United States v. Rauscher,
119 U.S. 407 (1886). Rauscher held that the circuit court acquired jurisdiction by
way of an extradition treaty to try an extradited defendant only for the crime for
which he had been extradited. Under Ker, if the defendant had been abducted, he
could have been tried for any offense and the United States would not have been in
violation of any treaty. But, once the treaty was invoked, the United States had
jurisdiction only according to the terms of the treaty.
124. See note 140 and accompanying text infra.
125. 288 U.S. at 121-22.
126. Not only must the court asserting its authority have jurisdiction over the
person, but also over the crime, in order for a prosecution to be within the bounds
of international law. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 8 (1965):
Effect of Lack of Jurisdiction
Action by a state in prescribing or enforcing a rule that it does not have
jurisdiction to prescribe or jurisdiction to enforce, is a violation of inter-
national law, ....
The United States could exert jurisdiction over a crime committed abroad based on
the protection of a state, id., § 18, or universal interest, id., § 34. Conduct outside its
1975]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Although protection of a state or universal interest can be a basis of
jurisdiction, 1 27 the United Nations Security Council, in its debates con-
cerning Israel's kidnapping of Adolph Eichmann from Argentina, rejected
an interest in apprehending criminals as a basis for acquiring jurisdiction
over the person, and thus a basis for invading a country's territorial sover-
eignty. 128 Additional support for the contention that abduction violates
the territorial sovereignty of a nation is found in the international custom
of return of the person upon demand by the invaded state. 129
The requirement of "demand" on the part of the invaded state for the
return of the abducted person was viewed as crucial in Lujan.1 0 Lujan
alleged, as did Toscanino, that his abduction violated the provisions of the
United Nations Charter and the Charter of the Organization of American
States securing the sovereignty of member states. The court held that
Lujan's failure to allege that either Argentina or Bolivia protested or
objected to his abduction was fatal to his reliance on those charters.' 3 ' In
other words, the Lujan court held that absent an objection by the injured
state, the individual has no standing to protest the violation of international
law. The violated provisions of the charters were "designed to protect the
territory that threatens the security of a state or the operation of its governmental func-
tions can be deemed a sufficient state interest to give the United States jurisdiction to
prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences to such conduct. See generally id.,
§ 33 (provided the conduct is generally recognized as a crime under the laws of
States that have reasonably developed legal systems). See id., § 34, at 97 (universal
interest in halting traffic in narcotics). On this basis, the United States could be
deemed to have a sufficient interest to acquire jurisdiction over the crime of conspiracy
to import narcotics although no act of Toscanino took place in the United States.
127. Id., §§ 18, 34.
128. See 500 F.2d at 277. In response to a letter from the Representative of
Argentina to the President of the United Nations Security Council (U.N. Doc. S/4336
(June 15, 1960)), the Security Council resolved that the Eichmann kidnapping was a
violation of Argentina's sovereignty:
The Security Council . . .
(1) Declares that acts such as that under consideration, which effect the
sovereignty of a Member State and therefore cause international friction,
may, if repeated, endanger international peace and security;
(2) Requests the Government of Israel to make appropriate reparation in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the rules of inter-
national law.
U.N. Doc. S/4349 (June 23, 1960).
Israel was not forced to return Eichmann, as negotiation between the two
countries resulted in Argentina waiving its demand for his return. 6 M. WHITEMAN,
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1109 (1968).
129. See, e.g., the case of Blatt and Converse, [1911] 2 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 309 (1941) [hereinafter cited as HACKWORTH]. In the Cantu
Case, [1914] 2 HACKWORTH 310, the United States protested the violation of its terri-
torial sovereignty by the Mexican government in seizing a Mexican fugitive. Return
of the abducted person resulted. See The Vincenti Affair, [1920] 1 HACKWORTH
624 (1940).
130. 510 F.2d at 67.
131. Id.
[VOL. 35
ILLEGAL ABDUCTIONS
sovereignty of states, and it is plainly the offended states which must in
the first instance determine whether a violation of sovereignty occurred,
or requires redress."'18
2
According to the Restatement (Second), Foreign Relations Law of
the United States, whether or not a right of a sovereign is to be enforced
at all is within the province of the head of state.133 The decision to pro-
test a violation is made not only in light of the legal issue, but also
in light of other circumstances, including political considerations. This
principle is true even when the particular provisions in the treaty estab-
lish certain benefits for individuals.'8 4 The individual's rights are viewed
as only derivative of the state's; if the state does not protest, then the
individual has no redress.' 35
Although it seems to be clearly established that it is the right of the
sovereign that is violated, a state may provide a remedy under its domestic
laws to give effect to a rule of international law. If no such domestic law
is in effect, then the particular international rules asserted must be self-
executing to be effective.'8 6 It is abundantly clear from the language in
132. Id.
133. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 163, comment d (1965).
134. Many international treaties are entered into to secure rights to the nationals
of the affected states. Examples of such treaties are in the areas of commerce and
navigation. For example, a navigation treaty might secure fishing rights. Id., § 115,
comment e.
135. According to the Supreme Court of Israel, dismissing Adolph Eichmann's
claim of lack of jurisdiction due to the violation of international law, the aggrieved
state may condone the violation of its sovereignty and waive its claims, including the
claim for the return of the offender to its territory and such waiver may be explicit
or by acquiescence. Any waiver remedies the violation of international law. 6 M.
WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1109 (1968). Another example of
this principle is found in the refusal of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the
Hague to order the return to France of an escaped prisoner of the British. The
court's refusal was based on the fact that a French police officer had returned the
prisoner to the British and thus had waived any objection to a violation of French
sovereignty. Savarkar's Case, [1910] 2 HACKWORTH 319 (1941). See also Fiocconi
v. Attorney General of the United States, 462 F.2d 475 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1059 (1972) ; 4 J. MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 603 (1906).
136. A self-executing treaty has been defined as one "which prescribes by its own
terms a rule of the Executive or for the courts or which creates obligations for in-
dividuals enforceable without legislative implementation." See Evans, Self-Executing
Treaties in the United States of America, 30 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 178, 185 (1953). A
treaty is "to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature,
whenever it operates of itself, without the aid of any legislative provision." Foster v.
Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
To be considered self-executing, the treaty must be sufficiently explicit with-
out additional implementing statutes, Bowater Steamship Co. v. Patterson, 303 F.2d
369, 378 (2d Cir.) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 860 (1962). In Sei
Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952), the court found the preamble and
article 1 of the U.N. Charter not to be self-executing, as they stated general purposes
and objectives and did not purport to impose legal obligations on the individual mem-
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both treaties137 that further domestic legislation would be necessary in
order to require that divestment of jurisdiction over the person result from
a violation of territorial sovereignty by abduction unaccompanied by pro-
test from the invaded state. Therefore, it is clear that in the absence of
a demand by the injured states for the redress of the asserted violation of
the treaties, the court in Lujan was correct in holding that the defendant
had no standing to protest his abduction based on any violation of the
charters. In Toscanino, however, it was alleged that:
the Uruguayan government claims that it had no prior knowledge of
the kidnapping nor did it consent thereto and had indeed condemned
this kind of apprehension as alien to its laws.' 38
The Lujan court noted that "to support this claim, Toscanino would have
to prove that the Uruguayan government registered an official protest
with the United States Department of State.' u3 9
The Tdscanino court did not answer the question as to whether the
violation of international treaties coupled with an appropriate protest would,
without more, require divestment of jurisdiction. However:
To hold otherwise would go far to nullify the purpose and effect of the
salutary principle, well established in Anglo-American jurisprudence,
that "international law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and
administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as
often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for
their determination."' 40
CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that the Lujan decision sharply curtailed the im-
plications of Toscanino, which was the first case to deny the applicability
of the Ker-Frisbie rule to illegal abductions. Lujan distinguished between
merely "illegal" and "unconstitutional" government misconduct. Yet to
question that admittedly "illegal government conduct"' 41 is a denial of
ber nations or to create rights in private persons. It was clear that future legislation
was contemplated to accomplish the declared objectives.
137. See note 121 supra.
138. 500 F.2d at 270 (quoting from Toscanino's petition).
139. 510 F.2d at 67 n.8. Exactly what form of protest is necessary to afford a
defendant standing to invoke a violation of international law is unclear. Lujan implied
that a formal protest accompanied by demand for return was probably sufficient. Since
any protest of the violation of territorial sovereignty would preclude establishment of
acquiescence by the injured nation, such a protest should be considered sufficient.
140. Dickinson, Jurisdiction Following Seizure or Arrest in Violation of Inter-
national Law, 28 Am. J. INT'L L. 231, 245 (1934).
141. 510 F.2d at 66. The element of torture, so heavily relied upon in Lujan as
the basis for the Toscanino decision, had nothing whatever to do with an illegal
arrest; the court did not acquire jurisdiction as a result of the torture in Toscanino.
Therefore, the illegal arrest, though not in any sense a merely technical violation, was
immaterial to the question of jurisdiction. The sole focus was the reprehensible
conduct of the government, which the Court of Appeals felt required an emphatic
judicial response.
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due process of law seems a perversion of those very words. Intellectually,
it is difficult to justify the holding in Lujan that the government may
kidnap and forcibly abduct a defendant to acquire jurisdiction over him
so long as they are not "too rough" in accomplishing their goal. Perhaps,
in a subsequent case, the Second Circuit will partially remedy this situation
by declaring an international abduction, properly asserted so as to amount
to a violation of international law, as sufficient to divest the court of juris-
diction. But as the law presently stands, at least in the Second Circuit, if
one is kidnapped by law enforcement officers with the intent to abduct
him into the jurisdiction to face trial, he should give his captors a physical
fight with the hope that the government's response to his actions will be
considered sufficiently outrageous to divest the court of jurisdiction. Such
a result reduces the law to a mere game of "cops and robbers."
